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R. v. Nur: A Positive Step but not
the Solution to the Problem of
Mandatory Minimums in Canada
Janani Shanmuganathan*

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, Parliament has steadily increased the
use of mandatory minimum sentences. Canada now ranks second in the
world — behind only the United States — in the number of offences it
has that carry mandatory minimums.1 In R. v. Nur,2 the Supreme Court of
Canada declared unconstitutional the three-year mandatory minimum
sentence for a first conviction for possession of a firearm. Prior to Nur,
the Court had not struck down a mandatory minimum sentence since
R. v. Smith,3 decided 30 years earlier. In the time between Smith and Nur,
the Court was asked to consider the constitutionality of four other
mandatory minimum sentences. But in each of these cases the Court
upheld the constitutionality of these minimums. Viewed in this context,
Nur is a key decision. It represents a critical step towards dismantling a
mandatory minimum regime that has gained a foothold in Canada.
I argue, however, that while a positive step for those in favour of
eliminating mandatory minimums, Nur is not the solution to the problem
of mandatory minimum sentences in Canada. I first argue that the

*
Associate at Di Luca Dann LLP and was co-counsel for the Respondent in R. v. Nur at
the Supreme Court of Canada, and for the intervener Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario) in
R. v. Lloyd at the Supreme Court of Canada.
1
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, News Release, “Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Costs Too Much” (8 September 2014), online: <https://bccla.org/news/2014/09/mandatoryminimum-sentencingcosts-too-much>.
2
[2015] S.C.J. No. 15, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] O.J. No. 5120
(Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Nur”].
3
[1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.), revg [1984] B.C.J. No. 1506
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Smith”].
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Supreme Court’s most recent decision in R. v. Lloyd 4 may have blunted
some of the optimism following its decision in Nur. Although Lloyd
declared another mandatory minimum unconstitutional — this time in
the context of drugs — the decision did so while denying the power to
issue declaratory relief to provincial court judges and affording judges an
ability to “opt out” of deciding constitutional challenges. In so doing, the
Court may have forgone an opportunity to speak with a stronger judicial
voice in favour of eliminating mandatory minimums.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, I argue that the problem of
mandatory minimum sentences is one that is too big for the courts to cure
on their own. Striking down unconstitutional mandatory minimums
through the courts is to attack the problem in a piecemeal manner. Not
only is this approach a painstakingly slow process, it is under-inclusive.
The high bar for finding a section 12 breach means mandatory minimums
will still be hard to successfully challenge. Mandatory minimum sentences
are a problem created by Parliament, and they are a problem only
Parliament can truly fix.
I begin Part II by reviewing the legal landscape preceding Nur. In Part
III, I provide an overview of the decision in Nur. In Part IV, I identify
some successful challenges to mandatory minimums that followed Nur in
an effort to illustrate the groundbreaking nature of the decision. In Part V,
I review the decision in Lloyd and argue that the decision may represent a
“lost opportunity”. In Part VI, I discuss why the problem of mandatory
minimum sentences may be a problem that only Parliament can fix. And
finally, in Part VII, I examine how this problem has been treated in other
jurisdictions to offer some possible solutions for our own. In so doing,
this article represents an invitation to the new government to cure a
problem exacerbated by its predecessor.

II. THE THREE DECADES BETWEEN SMITH AND NUR
Before Nur, the Supreme Court had declared a mandatory minimum
sentence unconstitutional in only one case: Smith. In Smith, the Court
found that a seven-year mandatory minimum for importing a narcotic
into Canada was grossly disproportionate and amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment.5 The Court used a reasonable hypothetical analysis
4
[2016] S.C.J. No. 13, 2016 SCC 13 (S.C.C.), affg [2014] B.C.J. No. 145 (B.C. Prov. Ct.),
revg [2014] B.C.J. No. 1212 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Lloyd”].
5
Smith, supra, note 3, at paras. 65-69.
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to find that it would be grossly disproportionate to subject a first time
offender who imported a single “joint of grass” into Canada to a seven-year
mandatory minimum sentence.6 The minimum breached section 12,
could not be saved under section 1, and was struck down.7
Following Smith, but prior to Nur, the Supreme Court was presented
with four other opportunities to consider the constitutionality of a
mandatory minimum sentence: R. v. Goltz,8 R. v. Morrisey,9 R. v. Latimer10
and R. v. Ferguson.11 In Goltz, the accused was charged with driving
while prohibited under section 86(1)(a)(ii) of the British Columbia Motor
Vehicle Act, contrary to section 88(1)(a).12 The offence carried a mandatory
minimum sentence of seven days imprisonment. The Court concluded
that the punishment was not grossly disproportionate.13
In Morrisey, the accused was charged with criminal negligence
causing death. While he was drunk and carrying a loaded rifle, the
accused tried to wake up his friend. The accused slipped and the gun
went off, killing his friend.14 The Court upheld the four-year mandatory
minimum.15
In Latimer, the accused was found guilty of second-degree murder
for the death of his daughter who had a severe form of cerebral palsy.16
The accused challenged the mandatory minimum for second-degree
murder — life with no chance of parole for 10 years. The Court held that
the minimum was not grossly disproportionate.17
And finally, in Ferguson, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
officer shot and killed a detainee during an altercation and was convicted
of manslaughter.18 Manslaughter with a firearm carried with it a four-year
mandatory minimum sentence. The accused challenged this minimum
6

Id., at para. 13.
Id., at paras. 73, 75.
8
[1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.), revg [1990] B.C.J. No. 11 (B.C.C.A.)
[hereinafter “Goltz”].
9
[2000] S.C.J. No. 39, 2000 SCC 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.), varg [1998] N.S.J. No. 116
(N.S.C.A.) [hereinafter “Morrisey”].
10
[2001] S.C.J. No. 1, 2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), affg [1998] S.J. No. 731
(Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter “Latimer”].
11
[2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.), affg [2006] A.J. No. 1150
(Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Ferguson”].
12
British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 288.
13
Goltz, supra, note 8, at paras. 82-85.
14
Morrisey, supra, note 9, at para. 5.
15
Id., at paras. 53-54, 58.
16
Latimer, supra, note 10, at para. 1.
17
Id., at para. 87.
18
Ferguson, supra, note 11, at para. 4.
7
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but the Court upheld its constitutionality.19 In Ferguson, the Court
also rejected the use of a constitutional exemption as a remedy for
an exceptional case where a grossly disproportionate sentence would result
from the imposition of a mandatory minimum. Rather, the Court
underscored that the only remedy for an unconstitutional mandatory
minimum was a declaration of invalidity.20
Given this lack of success for those challenging mandatory
minimums, it appears that the Supreme Court may have become more
reluctant to declare mandatory minimums unconstitutional in the years
following Smith. In response to this observation, some may argue that the
decision to uphold the constitutionality of the four minimums had to do
with the types of offences that were before the court rather than a change
in the Court’s approach to mandatory minimums. For instance, unlike the
offence in Smith, which captured a wide range of conduct, the offences in
Goltz, Morrisey¸ Latimer and Ferguson could arguably be committed in
only a limited number of ways. Indeed, the offences in the latter three
cases all required, at minimum, a death.
Though perhaps true, the “type of offence” argument, however, is not a
complete answer. Following Smith, the Supreme Court did alter how one
constructs an appropriate reasonable hypothetical. In Smith, the Court
crafted a reasonable hypothetical offender who shared no characteristics
with the actual offender before the court and fell on the least serious end of
the spectrum of conduct captured by the offence. This changed in Goltz.
In Goltz, the Court took a more restricted approach: it emphasized that a
reasonable hypothetical could not be one that was “far-fetched” or “only
marginally imaginable as a live possibility”.21 Goltz also held that where
there are several modes of committing an offence, courts could only
consider reasonable hypotheticals that shared the accused’s mode of
commission (e.g., in Goltz, the accused’s driving prohibition was based on
a registrar’s order under section 86(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, and the Court
limited reasonable hypotheticals to those who had been prohibited from
driving under the same provision).22 And finally, Goltz made the actual
facts of the case an important “benchmark” in shaping reasonable
hypotheticals.23 Goltz, accordingly, tightened the grip on the parameters of
the reasonable hypothetical analysis.
19
20
21
22
23

Id., at para. 29.
Id., at para. 57.
Goltz, supra, note 8, at para. 69.
Id., at paras. 72-73.
Id., at para. 70.
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Similarly, in Morrisey, the Court insisted that any reasonable
hypothetical must be “common”.24 It also went on to exclude the facts of
real, reported cases that were considered unusual and rare.25 Moreover,
the reasonable hypotheticals the Court constructed in Morrisey were ones
devoid of any personal characteristics.26
This narrowing of the reasonable hypothetical inquiry by the Supreme
Court led academics like Kent Roach to conclude that, “The recent
section 12 cases suggest that Parliament can create mandatory sentences
without worrying very much that they may be invalidated on the basis of
hypothetical best offenders.”27
The Supreme Court jurisprudence between Smith and Nur also reveals
another trend: deference to Parliament. In his article, “Searching for
Smith”, Kent Roach characterized the post-Smith Supreme Court
decisions upholding mandatory minimum sentences as moving from
activism to minimalism in interpreting and applying section 12. As he
observed, “The concern in Smith with whether a mandatory penalty is
grossly disproportionate in light of what is necessary to deter or
rehabilitate particular offenders, has been replaced by deference to
Parliament’s decision to stress punitive purposes of sentencing over
restorative ones.”28 Latimer illustrates Roach’s point. In Latimer, the
Court reiterated that it is not for the court to pass on the “wisdom of
Parliament” with respect to the gravity of various offences and the range
of penalties, which may be imposed upon those found guilty of
committing the offences.29 Rather, “Parliament has broad discretion in
proscribing conduct as criminal and in determining proper punishment.”30
The decision in Ferguson also prompted academic debate. In her
article, “From Smith to Smickle: The Charter’s Minimal Impact on
Mandatory Minimum Sentences”,31 Debra Parkes noted this split in
academic opinion. On the one hand, Ferguson was seen as a retreat from
substantive scrutiny of mandatory minimum sentences and a “lost
opportunity” to provide a remedy for exceptional cases caught within the
24

Morrisey, supra, note 9, at para. 33.
Id., at para. 50.
26
Id., at paras. 51-52.
27
Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences”
(2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Searching for Smith’”], at 408.
28
Id., at 412.
29
Latimer, supra, note 10, at para. 77.
30
Id.
31
Debra Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle: The Charter’s Minimal Impact on Mandatory
Minimum Sentences” (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d).
25
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wide net of mandatory minimum penalties.32 This was the view espoused
by Lisa Dufraimont. On the other hand, Benjamin Berger supported the
Court’s rejection of a constitutional exemption. In his view, to “mop up”
hard cases with constitutional exemptions would lend legitimacy to a
legislative process that may not have paid sufficient attention to the
substantive fairness of the laws it creates.33 While Dufraimont expressed
concern that judges would face substantial pressure to uphold laws by
having to invalidate a mandatory minimum sentence for everyone based
on an exceptional case, Berger appeared more confident that judges
would make unpopular decisions when faced with compelling cases.34
It was in this environment of uncertainty about what the Supreme
Court would do in future challenges to mandatory minimums that the
decision in Nur arose. Academics like Roach were longing for a decision
like Smith, one with a strong judicial and constitutional voice in support
of individualized justice.35 Dufraimont perhaps shared this opinion, but
appeared unconvinced that judges would actually take the plunge.
Berger, however, appeared optimistic.

III. THE DECISION IN NUR
In Nur, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to consider the
constitutionality of the three-year mandatory minimum contained in
section 95(1) of the Criminal Code.36 Section 95(1) is a hybrid scheme.
Where the Crown proceeds summarily, there is no mandatory minimum
sentence. Where the Crown proceeds by indictment, a mandatory minimum
of three years applies. In a split decision, the majority of the Supreme Court
declared the three-year mandatory minimum unconstitutional.37
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice McLachlin held that section 95(1)
casts its net over a wide range of potential conduct. Though in most
cases the mandatory minimum does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, in some reasonably foreseeable cases it may.38 The Court
again employed the device of a reasonable hypothetical offender: a
licensed and responsible gun owner who stores his unloaded firearm safely
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id., at 161-62.
Id., at 162.
Id.
Roach, supra, note 27, at 412.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “the Code”].
Nur, supra, note 2, at para. 106.
Id., at para. 4.
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with ammunition nearby, but makes a mistake as to where it can be
stored.39 According to the majority, given the minimal blameworthiness of
this offender and the absence of any harm or real risk of harm flowing
from the conduct, a three-year sentence would be grossly disproportionate.40
By capturing licensing offences that involved little or no moral fault and
little or no danger to the public, the minimum constituted cruel and
unusual punishment.41
Justice Moldaver, writing for the dissent, disagreed. In his view,
the reasonable hypothetical approach did not justify striking down the
minimum. First, the hypothetical licensing-type cases relied on by the
majority were not “grounded in experience” and in “common sense”.42
Moreover, the parties could not point to a single “real” case where an
offender who committed a licensing-type offence was prosecuted by
indictment and thereby attracted the mandatory minimum.43 According to
Justice Moldaver, an application of the reasonable hypothetical approach,
which assumes that the Crown will elect to proceed by indictment when
the fair, just, and appropriate election would be to proceed summarily does
not accord with common sense.44 After rejecting the majority’s approach,
he went on to offer a different analytical approach to section 12 when
dealing with hybrid schemes such as the one in section 95(1).
This divided judgment comes as little surprise when one looks back at
how the mandatory minimum jurisprudence had developed since Smith.
Justice Moldaver’s comments reflect the narrowing of the reasonable
hypothetical approach that took place following Goltz. Post-Goltz, a
reasonable hypothetical had to be “common” and not “far-fetched”, and
devoid of personal characteristics. By contrast, the reasonable hypothetical
offender constructed by Chief Justice McLachlin was nothing like the
offender before the court and fell on the least serious end of the spectrum
of conduct captured by section 95(1). Viewed in this way, the decision in
Nur represents a sharp turn back to the approach adopted in Smith.
It represents a loosening of the grip on reasonable hypotheticals that Goltz
and its progeny had imposed.
Furthermore, whereas Goltz and Morrisey were decisions seen as
being deferential to Parliament, Nur is not. Indeed, in his dissent, Justice
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id., at para. 82.
Id.
Id., at para. 83.
Id., at para. 125.
Id., at para. 126.
Id., at para. 129.
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Moldaver appears to directly accuse the majority of not respecting the
role of Parliament. According to Justice Moldaver, it was Parliament’s
choice to raise the mandatory minimums in section 95, and that choice
reflects valid and pressing objectives.45 In his words, “it is not for this
Court to frustrate the policy goals of our elected representatives based on
questionable assumptions or loose conjecture.”46
The majority’s comments in the Section 1 analysis also embody a
push back against Parliament. Shortly after Nur was released, then
Justice Minister Peter MacKay wrote an editorial in the National Post
where he announced that despite striking down the law, all nine justices
“actually agreed that mandatory prison sentences are legitimate criminal
justice tools.”47 The Court said no such thing. To the contrary, following
decades of empirical research, the Supreme Court finally agreed and
declared that mandatory minimum sentences do not, in fact, deter
crime.48 In so doing, the Court has effectively told Parliament that it
could no longer justify an unconstitutional mandatory minimum sentence
on the basis that it was rationally connected to deterrence. This is a far
cry from the deferential standard the Court emphasized in Goltz.

IV. THE AFTERMATH OF NUR
The decision in Nur is undeniably a positive step for those committed
to eliminating mandatory minimum sentences. At a time when mandatory
minimum sentences were steadily rising, the Supreme Court endorsed a
framework for challenging these minimums. Offenders who wish to
embark on a constitutional challenge now have a clear template: they can
either challenge the minimum on their own particular circumstances or
on the basis of a reasonable hypothetical. The Court also armed offenders
with guidance on how to craft an appropriate “reasonable hypothetical”
in their quest to strike these minimums down.
In the wake of Nur, in Ontario alone, at least three more mandatory
minimum sentences had been struck down. In R. v. Vu,49 for instance, the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that the six and nine month
45

Id., at para. 132.
Id., at para. 132.
47
Peter MacKay, National Post, “What the Court got right — and wrong — on mandatory
sentences for gun crimes” (April 21, 2015). See online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/
peter-mackay-what-the-court-got-right-and-wrong-on-mandatory-sentences-for-gun-crimes>.
48
Nur, supra, note 2, at para. 114.
49
[2015] O.J. No. 5278, 2015 ONSC 5834 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Vu”].
46
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mandatory minimum sentences contained in sections 7(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for the production of marijuana
violated section 12 of the Charter. The Court found the provisions
unconstitutional on the basis of a reasonable hypothetical offender: a
licensed marijuana producer who made a mistake and did not know he or
she was over their licence limit.50 The Court also found that the violation
was neither minimally impairing nor proportional and could not be saved
by section 1.51
Shifting from drugs back to firearms, in R. v. Hussain52 the Ontario
Superior Court declared the three-year mandatory minimum sentence for
trafficking a firearm unconstitutional. Again, the Court employed a
reasonable hypothetical. This time it was a licensed hunter who lent his
rifle to his brother, knowing that his brother does not have a possession
and acquisition licence. While hunting together, the brothers have the
misfortune of running into a former acquaintance, now a police officer,
who charges the accused.53 For this hypothetical offender, a sentence of
three years was found to constitute cruel and unusual punishment and
could not be saved by section 1.54
Although not exhaustive, these cases illustrate that the concerns that
existed in the decades following Smith — that Parliament could create
mandatory sentences without having to worry that they may be
invalidated on the basis of a reasonable hypothetical offender — may no
longer be as compelling as they once were. Viewed through this lens, the
decision in Nur is groundbreaking. Borrowing Roach’s words, those who
were left “searching for Smith” triumphed in Nur.

V. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY IN LLOYD
Following Nur, the Supreme Court was confronted with yet another
challenge to a mandatory minimum sentence in Lloyd. In Lloyd,
the Court dealt with the one-year mandatory minimum contained in
section 5(3)(a)(i)(d) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.55
The provincial court judge in Lloyd declared the provision contrary to

50
51
52
53
54
55

Id., at para. 175.
Id.
[2015] O.J. No. 6159, 2015 ONSC 7115 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Hussain”].
Id., at para. 101.
Id., at para. 105.
S.C. 1996, C. 19 [hereinafter “CDSA”].
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section 12 and not justified under section 1. 56 The British Columbia
Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal, finding that the
provincial court judge had no power to declare the provision invalid,
and set aside the declaration. 57 The majority of the Supreme Court
held that while the minimum was not grossly disproportionate for the
offender before the court, it could be in other reasonably foreseeable
cases and declared the minimum invalid. 58
Like Nur, the decision in Lloyd is positive for those in favour of
eliminating mandatory minimums. The Court declared yet another
mandatory minimum unconstitutional and sent a strong signal to
Parliament that mandatory minimums that apply to offences that cast a
wide net are vulnerable to constitutional challenge. However, the Court
was also confronted with two key issues that impact mandatory
minimums more broadly: (i) whether provincial court judges have the
power to invalidate legislation and (ii) whether a judge is obligated to
consider the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum where it can have
no impact on the sentence in the case at issue.59 The Court answered “no”
to both questions. In so doing, the decision may also represent a “lost
opportunity”.
First, the Court dealt with the issue of declaratory relief only briefly:
“The law on this matter is clear. Provincial court judges are not
empowered to make formal declarations that a law is of no force or effect
under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982; only superior court judges
of inherent jurisdiction and courts with statutory authority possess this
power.”60 According to the Court, provincial court judges only have the
power to decide the constitutional validity of a mandatory minimum
provision in the case before them.61 The Court did not explain why
provincial court judges lack this power, nor engage with any of the
practical reasons why provincial court judges should be granted this
power.
For instance, preventing provincial courts from making constitutional
declarations creates a needless duplication of proceedings. While
provincial court judgments are never binding, forbidding provincial court
judges from issuing declarations makes it impossible for judges to follow
56
57
58
59
60
61

Lloyd, supra, note 4, at para. 10.
Id., at para. 11.
Id., at paras. 25, 37.
Id., at para. 13.
Id., at para. 15.
Id., at para. 16.
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past provincial court decisions that have found mandatory minimums
unconstitutional absent a constitutional challenge. Though a past
judgment is persuasive, a provincial court judge cannot rely on it to
avoid imposing a mandatory minimum. The law remains presumptively
valid, and accused persons must bring the same challenge and seek the
same remedy over and over again in every case. This pointlessly wastes
judicial resources in an overburdened court system and it thwarts access
to justice.62
Furthermore, denying declaratory power to provincial court judges
creates the risk that unconstitutional laws will continue to be applied to
those who do not have the wherewithal to bring constitutional challenges.
If a provincial court judge finds a mandatory minimum unconstitutional
but has no declaratory power, the minimum remains in place. If an
accused in a future case does not bring a constitutional challenge, the law
is presumed valid and must be applied.63
The lack of declaratory relief also makes it difficult to access effective
remedies for unconstitutional mandatory minimums that attach to
summary conviction offences. Exclusive jurisdiction over summary
conviction offences lies with the provincial courts. Amendments to the
Safe Streets and Communities Act64 alone created six new mandatory
minimum sentences for offences where the Crown proceeds summarily.
Constitutional challenges to those minimums begin in the provincial court.
Indecent exposure, criminalized by section 173(2) of the Criminal
Code, provides an example. The offence now carries a mandatory
minimum sentence of 90 days on summary conviction. If a constitutional
challenge were launched against this minimum, a provincial court judge
62
The controversial victim fine surcharge perfectly illustrates the absurdity this causes. The
Criminal Code now requires a surcharge of 30 per cent on top of any fine imposed by a court or, in
cases where no fine is imposed, a mandatory charge of $100 per summary conviction offence and
$200 per indictable offence. In R. v. Michael, [2014] O.J. No. 3609, 2014 ONCJ 360 (Ont. C.J.),
Justice Paciocco of the Ontario Court of Justice found that the victim fine surcharge violated s. 12 of
the Charter on the facts of the offender before him (at para. 99). Assuming arguendo that this
decision is correct, a provincial court judge’s inability to issue declaratory relief would mean that
Justice Paciocco’s decision can have no application beyond the accused in that case. Another judge
of the provincial court would be unable to follow the decision to avoid applying the victim fine
surcharge unless the accused had brought another constitutional challenge to the surcharge. Given
how many accused persons pass through the “plea courts” in Canada’s provincial courts each and
every day, requiring a fresh challenge in every case is simply unworkable.
63
This is precisely what Justice Paciocco was told he was required to do with the victim
fine surcharge in the subsequent decision of R. v. Sharkey, [2015] O.J. No. 1275, 2015 ONSC 1657
(Ont. S.C.J.), revg [2014] O.J. No. 4153 (Ont. C.J.). Absent another challenge to the law, Justice
Paciocco had to apply the victim fine surcharge he struck down in Michael (Sharkey at para. 26).
64
S.C. 2012, c. 1.
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could find that the minimum is cruel and unusual punishment on the
basis of a real or hypothetical offender (e.g., an 18-year old accused with
no criminal record suffering from mental health issues that do not render
him not criminally responsible). If the challenge was successful but the
provincial court cannot make a declaration, the unconstitutional
minimum could survive on the books indefinitely. A broad declaration
could only be obtained on appeal to the Superior Court. The Crown could
immunize the minimum from a broad declaration of invalidity by simply
refusing to appeal any judgment where the law is not applied.
Despite being urged by the parties the Supreme Court did not speak
about any of these concerns in Lloyd. Even if a strict application of past
cases compels the conclusion that provincial court judges lack the power
to declare legislation invalid, the Court has the power to depart from its
own decisions but it chose not to on this issue. Perhaps more disappointing
is that the Court remained completely silent on all the problems caused by
the failure to grant provincial court judges declaratory power. Had the
Court engaged with these issues, it could have offered guidance to
Parliament to show them why the court system may not be an effective
forum for dealing with mandatory minimum sentences.
The Court similarly fell short when addressing the mootness issue.
The Court left the discretion to consider the constitutionality of
mandatory minimums in “moot” cases — where the minimum has no
impact on the offender before the court — with judges. In the Court’s
words, “judicial economy dictates that judges should not squander time
and resources on matters they need not decide.”65 To their credit, the
Court did go on to say that a formalistic approach should be avoided and
that the doctrine of mootness should be applied flexibly: “to compel
provincial court judges to conduct an analysis of whether the law could
have any impact on an offender’s sentence, as a condition precedent to
considering the law’s constitutional validity, would place artificial
constraints on the trial and decision-making process.”66 That being said,
the Court paused short of encouraging judges to decide constitutional
challenges to mandatory minimums even if the minimum has no effect
on the offender before the court.
Judges should be encouraged to decide such challenges. Constitutional
litigation is not only lengthy it is also expensive. However, there are
some accused — like the accused in Lloyd — who meet the requirements
65
66

Lloyd, supra, note 4, at para. 18.
Id.
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of standing and are willing to undertake the cost and effort of challenging
a mandatory minimum sentence knowing full well that they may prevail
on the merits but receive no tangible benefit in the end. It makes little
common sense to discourage these accused from undertaking such
important challenges.
Moreover, a requirement insisting that an offender personally benefit
before adjudicating a constitutional challenge appears to be rooted in the
concern that a better future claimant — one who is directly affected by the
law — may exist. This was precisely the concern which animated the British
Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in Lloyd: “If this court [the BCCA]
were to find for the Crown on the s. 12 issue, it would mean that people who
are potentially much more directly affected by the issue than is Mr. Lloyd
would be effectively precluded from raising challenges to the legislation
short of an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.”67
While this may be true for other types of constitutional challenges, the
reasonable hypothetical prong of the section 12 test eliminates this
concern. Under section 12, a court is not confined to the circumstances of
the immediate offender before it. Rather, a court is obliged to go on to
consider the circumstances of other offenders. The circumstances of a
“much more directly affected” accused can be considered as a reasonable
hypothetical. This branch of the section 12 inquiry therefore eliminates
any advantage that may be gained by waiting for a “better future
claimant”.
But as with the declaratory relief issue, the Court did not engage with
these concerns when it held that courts were not obligated to consider
constitutional challenges in moot cases. The concern this raises is that
post-Lloyd judges may decline to consider challenges to mandatory
minimums even after accused persons have invested time, effort and
money into bringing the challenge. While this concern does not appear to
have materialized yet, in cases following Lloyd some judges appear
to be pausing to ask whether they need to decide the constitutional
challenge at all.
For example, in R. v. Hofer,68 a challenge to the two-year mandatory
minimum for the production of marijuana arising out of British
Columbia, the judge commented that before proceeding to the section 12
analysis, “I note that reasons may exist for not hearing Mr. Hofer’s
67
R. v. Lloyd, [2014] B.C.J. No. 1212, 2014 BCCA 224, at para. 47 (B.C.C.A.), revd [2016]
S.C.J. No. 13 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lloyd BCCA”].
68
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application.”69 In the judge’s words, “if I were to conclude that I would
impose the same sentence on Mr. Hofer irrespective of the existence of
the mandatory minimum, it would not be necessary to resolve the
constitutional question.”70 However, because the parties agreed that but
for the minimum, the accused would likely receive a sentence of less
than two years, the judge proceeded with the challenge.71
While not a challenge to a mandatory minimum, similar comments
are seen in R. v. Antwi.72 In Antwi, the accused challenged the
constitutionality of section 85(4) of the Code, which requires consecutive
sentences for using a firearm in the course of committing an indictable
offence. After submissions had already been made on the challenge, the
Supreme Court released its decision in Lloyd. The judge in Antwi invited
counsel to return and make submissions on whether it was “necessary” to
decide the challenge.73 The judge ultimately concluded it was necessary
as it would affect the ultimate sentence and went on to decide the
challenge.74
Although in both Hofer and Antwi the judges ultimately went on to
decide the constitutional challenges, this was because both judges
deemed it was “necessary”. But what if the challenges were not
necessary? Would the judges have seen value in deciding the challenges
and proceeded, or would they have declined, leaving the potentially
unconstitutional provisions remaining on the books? The post-Lloyd
environment is thus reminiscent of the uncertainty we had following
Ferguson: Dufraimont’s skepticism of what judges will do on the one
hand versus Berger’s optimism on the other.

VI. THE COURTS ARE AN INEFFECTIVE FORUM
In both Nur and Lloyd, the Supreme Court declared a mandatory
minimum unconstitutional and, in their wake, other successful challenges
to mandatory minimums have sprouted up across the country. Despite
these positive results, the courts are ultimately an ineffective forum to
deal with the problem of mandatory minimum sentences in Canada: the
problem is simply too big for the courts to cure on their own.
69
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71
72
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74
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First, the Supreme Court held that mandatory minimums are not per
se unconstitutional, rather, only those minimums that result in grossly
disproportionate sentences are constitutionally invalid. As such, each
mandatory minimum must be individually attacked and each of these
challenges is long, protracted and costly. Nur itself was six years in the
making: the offence took place in 2009, was decided at the trial level in
2011, at the Court of Appeal in 2013 and finally, by the Supreme Court in
2015. If one mandatory minimum sentence took six years to completely
defeat, the task of defeating the 50 or so minimums at large is daunting,
if not impossible.
Second, even if a court strikes down a mandatory minimum sentence,
nothing prevents the Crown from appealing. For instance, the Crown is
appealing Vu to the Ontario Court of Appeal in an effort to overturn the
challenge. Similarly, nothing prevents Parliament from introducing a new
minimum to replace one that was invalidated. That is precisely what
happened after Nur. After the Supreme Court struck down the three-year
mandatory minimum, Parliament sought almost immediately to reintroduce the minimum through an Act aptly named, An Act to amend the
Criminal Code in response to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
R. v. Nur.75 While the Bill ultimately did not pass, this does not detract
from the fact that even where a court strikes down a mandatory
minimum, the threat of a new one lingers. The effect of this is that the
evil that the challenge seeks to remedy might not be expunged.
Third, the Court in Nur reiterated that a challenge to a mandatory
minimum must get over a “high bar” for what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter.76 What is required is
a finding on a balance of probabilities that the sentence is grossly
disproportionate to the appropriate punishment having regard to the
nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender.77 The gross
disproportionality test is aimed at punishments that are more than merely
excessive, and not every disproportionate or excessive sentence results in
a constitutional violation.
This is a high standard to meet. Some mandatory minimum sentences
simply cannot get there. For example, as previously noted, the Safe Streets
and Communities Act created a slew of mandatory minimum sentences for
the sexual exploitation of children. On summary conviction, the penalties
75
76
77
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range from 30 to 90 days.78 Given their short length, as was the case in
Goltz, while the sentences may be disproportionate for some offenders,
they may not be grossly so. As such, these minimums would remain on the
books. However, a disproportionate sentence invites the same destructive
consequences as grossly disproportionate ones: through their effect on
plea-bargaining, they raise the specter of wrongful convictions and, at the
end of the day, they do not work to deter crime.79 The standard of gross
disproportionality therefore acts as a bar for the courts to fix the problem
of mandatory minimum sentences. It leaves some minimums beyond the
courts’ reach to invalidate.
And finally, post-Lloyd, it is now clear that provincial court judges
lack the power to invalidate unconstitutional mandatory minimums. This
creates a further impediment to eliminating mandatory minimum sentences.

VII. MANDATORY MINIMUMS ARE PARLIAMENT’S PROBLEM
Today, our courts are involved in constitutional litigation on
everything from assisted suicide to prostitution and polygamy. The
problem of mandatory minimums is just one more difficult issue thrown
to the judiciary by Parliament. The courts have dealt with the problem as
best they can. However, striking down unconstitutional mandatory
minimums in a piecemeal manner is a painstakingly slow process.
Furthermore, the high bar for finding a section 12 breach means
mandatory minimums will still be hard to successfully challenge. To
truly redress the problem of mandatory minimums, widespread change is
needed. The solution lies with Parliament, not the courts.
A look at what other countries have done offers some possible
solutions for our problem. The obvious solution is to simply repeal
mandatory minimums. Some states in the United States have taken this
step, which has produced positive results. For example, Rhode Island
repealed all mandatory minimums for drug offences in 2009.80 Offences
involving less than one kilogram of heroin or cocaine, or less than five
kilograms of marijuana, for instance, previously carried a mandatory
minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum of 50 years.81 Now, there
is no mandatory minimum and a judge may assign a sentence anywhere
78
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from zero to 50 years.82 After the repeal, the state’s prison population
decreased (by 9.2 per cent) and the state saw a decline in violent crime
between 2009 and 2011.83 Whether or not this was a causational link, at
the very least, the statistics suggest that crime rates can drop even with
such repeals.
Rhode Island is not alone in this endeavour. In 2002, Michigan
completely abolished mandatory minimums for drug offences, eliminated
the stacking of consecutive sentences and restored the power of judges to
consider factors other than weight in determining penalties.84 Similarly,
in 2001, Louisiana repealed mandatory minimums for many non-violent
and simple drug possession offences and cut minimums in half for drug
trafficking. These changes, along with accompanying administrative
reforms and the expansion of treatment programs, have stabilized prison
population growth in Louisiana.85 Maine also passed legislation reducing
certain mandatory minimums and granting judges the authority to
suspend others.86 All told, at least 29 states have taken steps to roll back
mandatory sentences since 2000.87
At first blush, the repeal of mandatory minimum sentences may
appear too drastic of a move for Parliament to make. After all, we are
still on the heels of the former Conservative government’s tough on
crime agenda and mandatory minimums are purportedly politically
attractive.88 However, public opinion research reveals only limited
support for mandatory minimums.89 The current debate in Massachusetts
82
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is telling. Lawmakers held a hearing last year on a proposal to abolish
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offences. A statewide poll
conducted by MassINC found that only 11 per cent of those polled are in
favour of requiring judges to impose mandatory minimums.90
Maryland is considering the same proposal and public opinion there is
also in favour of repeal. For instance, 70 percent of Maryland voters
support the repeal of mandatory minimums for nonviolent drug
offenders, and 78 percent of Maryland voters agree that the state spends
too much money locking up nonviolent drug offenders.91 With respect to
the latter, the repeal of mandatory minimums does result in cost-savings.
For example, Michigan’s repeal of mandatory minimums was passed
with broad bipartisan support and saved the state $41 million in 2003.92
Canada would be no exception. The economic cost of mandatory
minimum sentencing is prohibitively high. For instance, according to the
Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO), the new mandatory minimums for
sexual offences in the Safe Streets and Communities Act were estimated
to cost $10.9 million over two years because of higher prison
populations.93 There is also the social cost. Not only is money wasted on
a policy that does not even reduce crime, but according to the Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA), money is also diverted away
from policies that do efficiently diminish crime.94 Not surprisingly, these
funds would be more effective if they were spent on investment in
employment, education, public housing, addictions treatment, and mental
health support services — all social services that have been proven to
reduce crime.95
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If an outright repeal is too drastic for Parliament, a second solution to
the problem of mandatory minimums is to build in an exemption or
escape clause. The Supreme Court in Lloyd made this same suggestion.96
These clauses can take different forms. In some jurisdictions, the clauses
apply to specific groups of offenders. For instance, in the United States,
some states that have adopted mandatory minimums for specific offences
have also created exceptions to the application of these minimums in the
case of juvenile offenders. This is the case, for example, in Montana
where there is an exception to mandatory minimum sentences for
offenders who were less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission
of the offence.97
Clauses may also take the form of relief in light of mitigating factors
(“the safety valve” approach). For instance, in South Australia, for some
offences, the courts have the power to reduce a penalty below the minimum
where “good reason” exists to do so. These reasons include the character,
antecedents, age or physical or mental condition of the offender; the fact that
the offence was trifling; or any other extenuating circumstances where the
court is “of the opinion that good reason exists for reducing the penalty
below the minimum, the court may so reduce the penalty.”98
The introduction of such exemption or escape clauses is not a new
concept in Canada. The Supreme Court has found that well-crafted
exemption clauses can cure issues of unconstitutionality. For example, in
Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia
(Attorney General),99 the Court held that British Columbia’s court
hearing fee regime violated section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867
because it was not coupled with an adequate exemption for people who
could not afford the fees.100 By contrast, in Canada (Attorney General) v.
PHS Community Services Society,101 the Court held that the prohibition
on the possession of controlled substances in section 4(1) of the CDSA
was constitutional because the exemption in section 56 of the CDSA
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acted as a “safety valve”. The exemption prevented the application of
section 4(1) to the staff and clients of Vancouver’s safe injection site.
Without it, the section would be unconstitutional.
Though an attractive alternative to repealing mandatory minimums,
exemption or escape clauses should be adopted with caution. They
possess the potential to create the same destructive consequences that
mandatory minimums create. For example, some states in the United
States allow for departures from mandatory minimums where an offender
pleads guilty or cooperates with the prosecution. In Florida, for instance,
the state attorney can request the court to reduce or suspend a sentence of
any person who is convicted of drug trafficking when the person
provides substantial assistance in the identification, arrest, or conviction
of any other person engaged in trafficking.102 The obvious concern is that
these clauses may be used to encourage or compel offenders to plead
guilty and cooperate with the state, raising the specter of wrongful
convictions.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Just prior to his election as Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau
stated that he would consider repealing some mandatory minimum
sentences introduced by the Conservative government. In his words:
Where we have concerns is in the overuse and quite frankly abuse of
mandatory minimums… It’s the kind of political ploy that makes
everyone feel good, saying, ‘We’re going to be tough on these
people,’ but by removing judicial discretion, and by emphasizing
mandatory minimums, you’re actually clogging up our jails for longer
periods of time and not necessarily making our communities any
safer.103

True to his word, upon being elected, our new Prime Minister has
made the review of mandatory minimums part of the Justice Minister’s
agenda.104 Since then, however, there has been radio silence. The concern
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is that Parliament may leave the problem of mandatory minimum
sentences in Canada to the courts.
Despite their best efforts, the courts are ill suited to tackle the
problem of mandatory minimums. The solution therefore lies with
Parliament, not the courts. Parliament created the problem of mandatory
minimums in this country. Our previous government exacerbated the
problem in its march down the path of being tough on crime. But our
new government is in a position to cure the problem. Whether the
solution is through the repeal of some mandatory minimums or through
the introduction of exemption or escape clauses, something needs to
be done.

